NTSB: Maryland didn’t assess Key Bridge that might have warned of vulnerability
68 bridges in 19 states have unknown ranges of vulnerability to vessel collision, NTSB warns
Subsequent week marks one yr because the hanging of the Day container ship with the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore. The bridge subsequently collapsed into the Potapsco River, killing 6 building crew members and injuring one other, in addition to 1 individual on board the vessel. I need to as soon as once more prolong our deepest sympathies to those that misplaced family members or have been injured on this horrible tragedy. At the moment we’re issuing 4 pressing security suggestions to bridge house owners, the Federal Freeway Administration, the USA Coast Guard, and the US Military Corps of Engineers. Particularly, we’re urging 30 house owners of 68 bridges in 19 states. To carry out *** vulnerability evaluation of their bridge’s danger of catastrophic collapse from *** vessel collision. Decide whether or not they should implement countermeasures to cut back vulnerability, report their findings to the NTSB, and if warranted, implement *** complete danger discount plan that features at *** minimal quick and long run methods to cut back the chance of *** bridge collapse from *** vessel collision. We’re additionally urging the Federal Freeway Administration in coordination with the US Coast Guard and the US Military Corps of Engineers to offer steerage and help to bridge house owners on evaluating and decreasing the danger of *** bridge collapse from *** vessel collision. As a part of our investigation, we accomplished *** vulnerability evaluation of the Francis Scott Key Bridge ourselves to find out how prone it was to break down from *** vessel collision, considering engineering and transport advances because the Key Bridge first opened in 1977. This vulnerability evaluation is basically *** mathematical danger mannequin used to find out how prone *** bridge is to break down from *** vessel collision, and it is not new. The American Affiliation of State Freeway and Transportation Officers, or ASHO developed and printed the vulnerability evaluation calculation for brand new bridges on the Nationwide Freeway System in 1991 in response to our investigation of the Sunshine Skyway bridge collapse in Tampa Bay, Florida. The state of Maryland was on Ashtoe’s government committee on the time and served on Ashtoe’s Freeway Subcommittee on Bridges and Constructions which developed these requirements in 1991 and revised them in 2009. Included within the 1991 requirements was *** suggestion from Ashtoe that every one bridge house owners conduct *** vulnerability evaluation of present bridges to judge the danger of catastrophic collapse within the occasion of *** vessel collision and take motion. Ashtoe reiterated that suggestion to states once more in 2009. And I need to learn the quote from the Ashto steerage in 2009. All remaining present bridges over navigable waterways with industrial barge and ship visitors must be evaluated utilizing *** vulnerability evaluation in accordance with danger evaluation procedures contained on this information. The vulnerability assessments would meet NTSB suggestions to Ashtoe. FHWA and different federal businesses for improved bridge security based mostly on earlier vessel collision accidents involving bridge failures. Ashtoe continues on based mostly on the vulnerability evaluation evaluations of present bridges inside the state system. *** screening course of based mostly on the estimated annual frequency of collapse can be utilized to establish and rank excessive danger bridges and to prioritize susceptible buildings for potential rehabilitation, retrofit, peer safety countermeasures or alternative. The Maryland Transportation Authority by no means ran the calculation on the Key Bridge, and as of October 2024, they nonetheless have not on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge. Had they ran the calculation on the Francis Scott Key Bridge, the MDTA would have been conscious. That the bridge was nearly 30 occasions larger than the danger threshold Ashtoe units for crucial important bridges, 30 occasions larger. And nearly 15 occasions larger for peer 17, which the dolly struck in addition to pier 18. What’s irritating shouldn’t be solely did MDTA fail to conduct the vulnerability evaluation on the important thing bridge, they didn’t present, nor have been they capable of present the NTSB with the info wanted to conduct the evaluation, together with the traits of vessel visitors passing underneath the bridge. Vessel transit speeds, vessel loading traits, waterway and navigable channel geometry, water depths, environmental circumstances, bridge geometry, peer safety programs, and supreme lateral capability of the bridge piers. We requested them for that information. They did not have it. We needed to develop that information ourselves with the assistance of our federal companions on the Federal Freeway Administration. And I need to take *** second to thank the staff on the Federal Freeway Administration for all their help on this investigation. We conclude in our report that had the MDTA performed *** vulnerability evaluation of the Key Bridge based mostly on current vessel visitors, the MDTA would have been capable of proactively establish methods to cut back the danger of *** collapse and lack of lives related to *** vessel collision with the bridge. Just like the Key Bridge, different bridges all through the USA have been designed earlier than Ashtoe’s 1991 steerage. To know the scope of that danger, we requested the Federal Freeway Administration to establish bridges that cross navigable waterways and are utilized by ocean-going vessels just like the Dali. And collect details about safety gadgets in place for these bridges like dolphins like fender programs. We then narrowed that listing based mostly on when the bridge was constructed, whether or not it had *** vertical clearance of a minimum of 80 ft, and whether or not it had substructures reminiscent of piers in *** waterway. We additionally evaluated vessel visitors transiting underneath the bridges. We repeated the identical course of for bridges owned by the US Military Corps of Engineers, and as *** outcome, we recognized 72 bridges in 19 states managed by 30 bridge house owners that have been seemingly not designed and constructed to ash to specs. Homeowners of 4 of these bridges carried out *** current vulnerability evaluation and are both implementing *** plan to cut back their bridge’s vulnerability or can be doing so sooner or later. The remaining 68 bridges that haven’t undergone *** vulnerability evaluation based mostly on current vessel visitors have an unknown. Stage of danger of collapse from *** vessel collision, which is why we’re recommending that these 30 bridge house owners take motion now. Frankly, we have been sounding the alarm on this because the tragedy occurred and in testimony earlier than the Home Transportation and Infrastructure Committee final April, we’d like motion. Public security will depend on it. So the 30 bridge house owners who will obtain our pressing suggestions are the Bay Space Toll Authority. Caltrans, the Golden Gate Bridge Freeway and Transportation District, the US Military Corps of Engineers, the Florida Division of Transportation, the Georgia Division of Transportation, Skyway Concession Firm LLC, the Louisiana Division of Transportation and Improvement, the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad. The Maryland Transportation Authority. The Massachusetts Division of Transportation, the Mackinaw Bridge Authority, the New Hampshire Division of Transportation, the Delaware River Port Authority, the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, MTA bridges and tunnels, the New York Metropolis Division of Transportation, the New York State Bridge Authority, the Ogdensburg Bridge and Port Authority, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The Seaway Worldwide Bridge Company, the 1000 Islands Bridge Authority, the Ohio Division of Transportation, the Oregon Division of Transportation, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Fee, the Rhode Island Turnpike and Bridge Authority, the Harris County Toll Street Authority, the Texas Division of Transportation, the Washington State Division of Transportation, and the Wisconsin Division of Transportation. Now I need to emphasize as a result of we do not need to see headlines naming *** bridge of being vulnerable to collapse or imminent danger of collapse. *** danger degree above the suitable threshold does not imply *** collapse from *** vessel collision is an absolute certainty. Likewise, *** bridge designed with *** danger degree beneath the suitable threshold would not assure that *** collapse from *** vessel collision will not happen. What we’re telling bridge house owners is that they should know the danger. And decide what actions they should take to make sure security. Once more, I need to reiterate our precise findings at the moment and all 4 pressing security suggestions verbatim. For locating primary, had the Maryland Transportation Authority performed *** vulnerability evaluation of the Francis Scott Key Bridge based mostly on current vessel visitors as really helpful by the 1991. And 2009, American Affiliation of State Freeway and Transportation officers information specs. The MDTA would have been conscious. That this crucial important bridge was above the ash toe threshold of danger for catastrophic collapse from *** vessel collision when the dolly collision occurred discovering quantity 2. Had the Maryland Transportation Authority performed *** vulnerability evaluation of the Francis Scott Key Bridge utilizing the American Affiliation of State Freeway and Transportation Officers technique 2 vulnerability evaluation calculation, the MDTA would have had data to proactively establish methods to cut back the danger of *** collapse and lack of lives related to *** vessel collision with the bridge. Discovering quantity 3, the 30 house owners of 68 bridges over navigable waterways frequented by ocean-going vessels are seemingly unaware of their bridge’s danger of catastrophic collapse from *** vessel collision and the potential must implement countermeasures to cut back the bridge’s vulnerability. Pressing suggestion one to the Federal Freeway Administration in coordination with the US Coast Guard and US Military Corps of Engineers, set up an interdisciplinary staff, together with representatives from the Federal Freeway Administration, US Coast Guard, and US Military Corps of Engineers and supply steerage and help to bridge house owners on evaluating and decreasing the danger of *** bridge collapse from *** vessel collision. Pressing suggestion quantity 2. The US Coast Guard and the US Military Corps of Engineers is the recipient of advice quantity 2. Help the Federal Freeway Administration in establishing an interdisciplinary staff. And supply steerage and help to bridge house owners on evaluating and decreasing the danger of *** bridge collapse from *** vessel collision. Pressing suggestion quantity 3 to the 30 bridge house owners. Calculate the Ashtoe technique 2 annual frequency of collapse for the bridges recognized in Appendix B of the report that we issued at the moment for which you’re accountable and inform the NTSB whether or not the chance of collapse is above the ash toe threshold if the calculations that you just carried out in response to the security suggestion. Point out that *** bridge has an annual frequency of collapse larger than the Ashow threshold. Develop and implement *** complete danger discount plan that features at *** minimal steerage and help from the Federal Freeway Administration, US Coast Guard, and US Military Corps of Engineers interdisciplinary staff. And the 4th suggestions develop quick and long run methods to cut back the chance of *** potential bridge collapse from *** vessel collision. Now *** few issues in regards to the standing of the investigation itself. We’re releasing over 1000 pages of investigative materials within the public docket at the moment, together with our bridge factual report and a few interviews. Subsequent week we intend to launch the hazardous supplies, meteorological and survival components factual stories, in addition to *** research performed by our Workplace of Analysis and Engineering on vessel dimension will increase and related security danger. Within the subsequent few weeks, we intend to publicly launch the Voyage information recorder audio transcripts and related information. We’re nonetheless finalizing the engineering, nautical operations, and Anchorage factual stories. We’ll then start engaged on our evaluation and growing our findings, our possible trigger, and our security suggestions with *** ultimate report launched this fall. Now with that, I’ll take some questions. Please elevate your hand. I am going to name on you. Please state your identify and your affiliation. So I do know you mentioned that the MDTA didn’t present or not calculate these danger assessments on the Key bridge. The dolly was *** sizable cargo ship. So had the MDTA performed this evaluation, might they’ve put measures in place you imagine might have prevented this collapse? And in that case, what kinds of measures would have been? Yeah, so these bridge house owners must be current vessel visitors. Issues issues have modified over time. Vessels have gotten. Larger, heavier. At one level within the Nineteen Fifties we had vessels that had simply 800 containers on them. Now we’re speaking 24,000 containers, so they should take *** take a look at particular measures which can be included within the Ash toe steerage. So sure, MDTA would have recognized the danger and will have taken motion to safeguard the Key Bridge. Do you assume that might have been prevented? Had they accomplished that, the collapse could not, it might have been prevented. Sure, positive, Hama, it feels like from what you are saying these 68 bridges, the house owners haven’t accomplished these assessments, um, however do you count on that the overwhelming majority, in the event that they do these assessments, the overwhelming majority of these bridges could be above the suitable degree of danger and wish important enhancements. The query is whether or not the 30 bridge house owners that have been issuing these suggestions do. Whether or not we imagine their danger evaluation will present that they are above the ash toe threshold, we do not know that that’s one thing that this is the reason we’re urging these bridge house owners to take motion. We’re hoping it is only a few, however we do not know that right now. We imagine they do not know that and they should. Decide what the danger is and begin to put in these protecting measures if warranted. One factor I do need again to your first, your query on might they’ve taken motion, would have prevented it. This isn’t new. They may have been evaluated. MDTA might have accomplished this analysis quite a few occasions over the previous a number of many years. They have been. It was really helpful by ASO in 1991. It was really helpful by ASHO in 2009. They have been a part of that subcommittee in issuing these suggestions, and so they particularly ought to have seemed on the change in vessel visitors definitely after the 2016 growth of the Panama Canal. Sure, thanks for taking my query. Phil Yakubuski from WBIO radio in Baltimore, uh, you talked in regards to the course of that they need to have accomplished these assessments. Had been there warnings letter warning letters despatched to them? Um, are you able to speak about that? Uh, how did you retain tabs that this was not being accomplished? So the query is the vulnerability assessments and the way MDTA had not accomplished these vulnerability assessments. It was *** suggestion from Ashto in 1991 and once more in 2009. As a part of our investigation, we requested. Had you accomplished these vulnerability assess this vulnerability evaluation on the important thing bridge, the reply was no. We then requested, Are you doing this vulnerability evaluation on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge? The reply is not any. They haven’t. Sure, sir. These suggestions, how do you comply with up on this? Oh, I am sorry, I am Allan Edder from WTOP right here in Washington. Thanks. Um, you’ve got made these suggestions. What is the, what’s the follow-up appear to be? How, how can you make sure that these The query is on the comply with up and pressing suggestions. After we problem pressing suggestions, we’re saying. There’s *** security deficiency right here, *** potential security danger, and it’s essential to take rapid motion. So we’ll comply with up with the entire bridge house owners over time. We are going to comply with up with federal highways. We had *** briefing with for federal highways at the moment. I additionally referred to as the state of Maryland to ensure they knew that we have been issuing this, in addition to a number of others, so we count on motion, and we, we’ve got a complete staff that follows up on these suggestions and can achieve this. Ms. Kate Amara from WBALTP in Baltimore. I’m curious if the Bay Bridge is on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge in Maryland is on the listing of the 68 bridges as a result of I’m additionally questioning in that case, might that be the one bridge of the 68 the place the house owners knew it was on the listing as a result of again in Could, your preliminary report particularly directed the MDTA to do quick time period and long run research to improve the present safety. So is the Bay Bridge on the listing? Did they already know they have been on this listing, and do you may have any, did they offer you any clarification for why as of November the evaluation nonetheless had not been performed? Yeah, the query is on did MDTA is the Chesapeake Bay Bridge on the listing of 68 bridges and its bridges and bridge spans? The reply is sure. The east and westbound parts of the bridge are on the listing of 68. Uh, after which the query is about, uh, their vulnerability evaluation and conducting the vulnerability evaluation. Uh, we, we requested MDTA, are you doing it in writing as of October, they acknowledged, no. Definitely in the event that they construct *** new bridge they should, however as of the present bridge we all know that they haven’t accomplished that calculation that that vulnerability evaluation takes *** very long time. There is no motive why they should not have accomplished it prior to now. It should not take an pressing security suggestion to get motion, and we count on that to be accomplished now. Uh, and we’ll comply with up. Positive, sure, sir. Adam Adam Tusk, Channel 4 right here in DC. Individuals have *** arduous time driving over the Bay Bridge as it’s proper now. What would your recommendation be to them if the, the security danger is form of unknown at this cut-off date? Yeah, the query is about considerations over security and driving over the Bay Bridge. I additionally drive over the Bay Bridge at occasions. Uh, I might say the rationale we’re issuing pressing security suggestions is we do not need this to happen. Definitely. The identical kind of visitors goes underneath the Bay Bridge however at larger speeds and so what we are attempting to do is forestall one thing sooner or later. That’s at all times what we’re attempting to do in issuing our security suggestions on this case they should know the danger and take motion. It does not imply there’s *** danger there. They simply do not. proper now, so they should decide that and do some work. However in your opinion, is that this one thing that drivers ought to think about once they make *** route selection once they determine I will take that bridge or go *** completely different means. Is that this one thing that drivers ought to think about? I imply, drivers must make their very own choices, uh, particularly, uh, you realize, with regards to their everyday journey. Sure ma’am. Hello Fredosa Stover with Fox Information Channel. Have you ever spoken with the Maryland Governor, uh, West Moore in regards to the challenges with MT MDTA? Have I spoken with Governor Westmore in regards to the challenges with MDTA. We, our investigative staff has labored effectively with MDTA all through the investigation. They’ve gotten *** lot of knowledge from them. Um, they did not have the knowledge to offer, so it wasn’t that they have been withholding the knowledge. Uh, however they did not have the info that wanted to enter that calculation. Uh, why that’s is one other problem. They need to have had that information. We did the work, uh, however they’ve labored effectively with our staff. Sure, sir, after which I am going to go over right here. Baltimore Solar. um have you learnt if they’ve modified any of their information assortment programs and if, in the event that they even have the info to have um *** full danger evaluation for the Bay Bridge at this level. Uh, does MDTA have the info to do *** full danger evaluation of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge? They’ve definitely had. To not go forward and get that information collectively. That is a part of our, uh, suggestions the place we’re asking urging Federal Freeway Administration, the US Coast Guard, and others to work with the states to assist them try this. Uh, so hopefully they will be capable to take motion, however that is *** nice query for MDTA on what they do have obtainable for the Chesapeake Bay. Yeah. Elizabeth Worthington from WAR2 Information in Baltimore. Um, so that you testified final spring. Within the Senate that after that Sunshine Skyway bridge collapse, the NTSB really helpful to the Coast Guard to judge peer safety programs within the context of the transport visitors goes to sea, however that was by no means accomplished as a result of the Coast Guard mentioned on the time it did not have the authority. Have they got the authority and are they doing that now? And that testimony was earlier than Home Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Uh, you realize, their authority, I believe, is the, is, I do not know the reply to their authority. We are going to get again to you on that. They didn’t have the authority on the time. Uh, Federal Highways Administration additionally at the moment would not have the authority to mandate that that danger evaluation and people adjustments for these older bridges previous to 1991, however what I did testify to at the moment is that bridge house owners must take motion now and never wait. After which yeah. Sort of two questions like, have been you stunned by these numbers after which additionally um simply to get at this, why, why are the assessments so vital? We have been we stunned by the numbers? I can say sure, we have been very stunned that they have been so excessive, 30, nearly 30 occasions larger than the edge that Ashtoe units, and 15 occasions for ier 17 and ier 18. Uh, that is, that was *** shock to all of us, uh, however you realize it is one thing that MDTA might have recognized and may have recognized, uh, and why is it extra vital you requested, it is vital to grasp danger so as to take motion now, implement quick time period and long run methods to make sure public security. Final query. So we truly requested MDTA over the summer time once we have been doing *** story for the ASO frequency of collapse calculations and MDTA replied, that is *** direct quote from them. This specification on evaluation for peer safety is used solely when designing *** new construction to find out if. Slash the place safety is required. Had been they flawed on that? Uh, they may need to. We have been they there was *** quote, uh, any individual examine *** response on peer safety and about the way it applies to new bridges that 1991 they may need to learn their very own steerage. They have been on the Ashow government Committee in 1991 and so they have been on the subcommittee that developed the 1991 steerage and the 2009 replace. It says very clearly on like web page 3. It’s best to do the identical calculation and danger evaluation and put protecting measures in place, uh, in your present bridges earlier than this steerage got here out. So there is not any excuse. Thanks a lot.
NTSB: Maryland didn’t assess Key Bridge that might have warned of vulnerability
68 bridges in 19 states have unknown ranges of vulnerability to vessel collision, NTSB warns
Maryland didn’t assess the Francis Scott Key Bridge for its vulnerability from a vessel collision and nonetheless has but to evaluate the Chesapeake Bay Bridge, the Nationwide Transportation Security Board introduced Thursday afternoon.Nationwide Transportation Security Board Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy supplied an replace Thursday afternoon to the investigation of the Key Bridge collapse, asserting the company is issuing pressing security suggestions to 30 house owners of 68 bridges in 19 states to evaluate the buildings’ vulnerability from a vessel collision.”Bridge house owners must take motion now and never wait,” Homendy mentioned.The NTSB mentioned its report doesn’t recommend that the 68 bridges are sure to break down. The company mentioned the bridges must be evaluated to find out whether or not they’re above the suitable degree of danger set by the American Affiliation of State Freeway and Transportation Officers.NTSB: MDTA would’ve recognized Key Bridge’s danger had evaluation been doneHomendy mentioned the Maryland Transportation Authority didn’t run a vulnerability evaluation calculation on the Key Bridge, and as of October 2024, nonetheless hasn’t accomplished so for the Chesapeake Bay Bridge.Homendy mentioned had the evaluation been accomplished, “the MDTA would’ve recognized the danger and will’ve taken motion to forestall the collapse.” The NTSB mentioned such an evaluation would have supplied data to proactively scale back the Key Bridge’s danger of a collapse.Homendy mentioned the NTSB needed to conduct its personal vulnerability evaluation of the Key Bridge since its opening in 1977.”Had they ran the calculation on the Francis Scott Key Bridge, the MDTA would’ve been conscious that the bridge was nearly 30 occasions larger than the danger threshold for crucial important bridges and nearly 15 occasions larger for Pier 17, which the Dali struck, in addition to Pier 18,” Homendy mentioned.NTSB performed its personal evaluation; MDTA did not have the dataThe NTSB additionally mentioned the MDTA did not have the info wanted to calculate the bridge’s vulnerability of catastrophic collapse from a vessel collision per AASHTO thresholds.”Not solely did MDTA fail to conduct the vulnerability evaluation on the Key Bridge, they didn’t present, nor have been they capable of present, NTSB the info wanted to conduct the evaluation,” Homendy mentioned. “We requested for that information, they did not have it. We needed to develop that information ourselves.”Documentary above: “Key Bridge Catastrophe: Replicate, Get better, RebuildHomendy mentioned Maryland authorities have labored effectively with the NTSB staff, they only did not have the info.”The MDTA might’ve accomplished this analysis quite a few occasions over the previous a number of many years. The AASHTO suggestions have been issued in 1991 and in 2009. (Maryland was) a part of the subcommittee issuing the suggestions,” Homendy mentioned. Homendy mentioned the Chesapeake Bay Bridge is among the many 68 bridges for which a vulnerability evaluation must be accomplished.”I additionally drive over the Bay Bridge at occasions. The rationale we’re issuing pressing security suggestions is we do not need this to happen,” Homendy mentioned. “The identical kind of visitors goes underneath the Bay Bridge, however at larger speeds. So, we are attempting to forestall one thing sooner or later … they should know the danger and take motion. It does not imply there’s danger there. They simply must do the work (to determine the danger).”NTSB listing of 68 bridges in want of inspectionThe following is an inventory of the 68 bridges for which the NTSB says assessments are wanted to find out the danger of collapse from a vessel collision.CaliforniaRichmond-San Rafael BridgeCarquinez BridgeAntioch BridgeSan Mateo-Hayward BridgeCoronado BridgeGolden Gate BridgeDelawareSummit BridgeSt. Georges BridgeReedy Level BridgeFloridaSunshine Skyway BridgeNapoleon Bonaparte Broward Bridge (Dames Level Bridge)GeorgiaTalmadge BridgeIllinoisChicago Skyway Calumet River BridgeLouisianaHuey P. Lengthy BridgeGreater New Orleans BridgeIsrael LaFleur BridgeCrescent Metropolis Connection BridgeHale Boggs (Lulin) BridgeHorace Wilkinson BridgeGramercy (Veterans Memorial) BridgeSunshine BridgeMarylandWilliam Preston Lane Jr. (Bay) Bridge (each spans)Chesapeake Metropolis BridgeMassachusettsTobin Bridge (northbound decrease)Bourne BridgeSagamore BridgeMichiganMackinac BridgeNew HampshireMemorial BridgeNew JerseyCommodore Barry BridgeVincent R. Casciano (Newark Bay) BridgeNew YorkVerrazano Narrows Bridge (each spans)Brooklyn BridgeManhattan BridgeWilliamsburg BridgeNewburgh-Beacon Bridge (each spans)Rip Van Winkle BridgeOgdensburg-Prescott Worldwide BridgeGeorge Washington BridgeOuterbridge Crossing BridgeSeaway Worldwide BridgeThousand Islands BridgeOhioCUY-00490-0010 (I-490) BridgeCUY-00002-1441 (Predominant Avenue) BridgeCUY-00006-1456 (Detroit Avenue) BridgeCUY-00010-1613 (Carnegie Avenue) BridgeLUC-01W02-00002 (Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial) BridgeLUC-00002-1862 (Anthony Wayne) BridgeOregonAstoria-Megler BridgeSt. Johns BridgePennsylvaniaWalt Whitman BridgeBenjamin Franklin BridgeBetsy Ross BridgeDelaware River Turnpike BridgeRhode IslandClaiborne Pell Newport BridgeTexasBuffalo Bayou Toll BridgeSidney Sherman BridgeRainbow BridgeVeterans Memorial BridgeHartman Bridge (each spans)GulfGate BridgeWashington StateLewis and Clark BridgeWisconsinLeo Frigo BridgeWhat occurred in Baltimore?The Dali container ship struck the bridge within the early morning hours of March 26, 2024, inflicting the construction to break down into the Patapsco River.Six building employees died within the bridge collapse.The results of the collapse rippled throughout Baltimore as longshoremen misplaced enterprise, commuters misplaced their journey route and provide chain delays disrupted the financial system.The 1.6-mile bridge opened in March 1977 as the ultimate hyperlink of the Baltimore Beltway (Interstate 695), crossing over the Patapsco River.
Maryland didn’t assess the Francis Scott Key Bridge for its vulnerability from a vessel collision and nonetheless has but to evaluate the Chesapeake Bay Bridge, the Nationwide Transportation Security Board introduced Thursday afternoon.
Nationwide Transportation Security Board Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy supplied an replace Thursday afternoon to the investigation of the Key Bridge collapse, asserting the company is issuing pressing security suggestions to 30 house owners of 68 bridges in 19 states to evaluate the buildings’ vulnerability from a vessel collision.
“Bridge house owners must take motion now and never wait,” Homendy mentioned.
The NTSB mentioned its report doesn’t recommend that the 68 bridges are sure to break down. The company mentioned the bridges must be evaluated to find out whether or not they’re above the suitable degree of danger set by the American Affiliation of State Freeway and Transportation Officers.
NTSB: MDTA would’ve recognized Key Bridge’s danger had evaluation been accomplished
Homendy mentioned the Maryland Transportation Authority didn’t run a vulnerability evaluation calculation on the Key Bridge, and as of October 2024, nonetheless hasn’t accomplished so for the Chesapeake Bay Bridge.
Homendy mentioned had the evaluation been accomplished, “the MDTA would’ve recognized the danger and will’ve taken motion to forestall the collapse.” The NTSB mentioned such an evaluation would have supplied data to proactively scale back the Key Bridge’s danger of a collapse.
Homendy mentioned the NTSB needed to conduct its personal vulnerability evaluation of the Key Bridge since its opening in 1977.
“Had they ran the calculation on the Francis Scott Key Bridge, the MDTA would’ve been conscious that the bridge was nearly 30 occasions larger than the danger threshold for crucial important bridges and nearly 15 occasions larger for Pier 17, which the Dali struck, in addition to Pier 18,” Homendy mentioned.
NTSB performed its personal evaluation; MDTA did not have the info
The NTSB additionally mentioned the MDTA did not have the info wanted to calculate the bridge’s vulnerability of catastrophic collapse from a vessel collision per AASHTO thresholds.
“Not solely did MDTA fail to conduct the vulnerability evaluation on the Key Bridge, they didn’t present, nor have been they capable of present, NTSB the info wanted to conduct the evaluation,” Homendy mentioned. “We requested for that information, they did not have it. We needed to develop that information ourselves.”
Documentary above: “Key Bridge Catastrophe: Replicate, Get better, Rebuild
Homendy mentioned Maryland authorities have labored effectively with the NTSB staff, they only did not have the info.
“The MDTA might’ve accomplished this analysis quite a few occasions over the previous a number of many years. The AASHTO suggestions have been issued in 1991 and in 2009. (Maryland was) a part of the subcommittee issuing the suggestions,” Homendy mentioned.
Homendy mentioned the Chesapeake Bay Bridge is among the many 68 bridges for which a vulnerability evaluation must be accomplished.
“I additionally drive over the Bay Bridge at occasions. The rationale we’re issuing pressing security suggestions is we do not need this to happen,” Homendy mentioned. “The identical kind of visitors goes underneath the Bay Bridge, however at larger speeds. So, we are attempting to forestall one thing sooner or later … they should know the danger and take motion. It does not imply there’s danger there. They simply must do the work (to determine the danger).”
NTSB listing of 68 bridges in want of inspection
The next is an inventory of the 68 bridges for which the NTSB says assessments are wanted to find out the danger of collapse from a vessel collision.
California
- Richmond-San Rafael Bridge
- Carquinez Bridge
- Antioch Bridge
- San Mateo-Hayward Bridge
- Coronado Bridge
- Golden Gate Bridge
Delaware
- Summit Bridge
- St. Georges Bridge
- Reedy Level Bridge
Florida
- Sunshine Skyway Bridge
- Napoleon Bonaparte Broward Bridge (Dames Level Bridge)
Georgia
Illinois
- Chicago Skyway Calumet River Bridge
Louisiana
- Huey P. Lengthy Bridge
- Larger New Orleans Bridge
- Israel LaFleur Bridge
- Crescent Metropolis Connection Bridge
- Hale Boggs (Lulin) Bridge
- Horace Wilkinson Bridge
- Gramercy (Veterans Memorial) Bridge
- Sunshine Bridge
Maryland
- William Preston Lane Jr. (Bay) Bridge (each spans)
- Chesapeake Metropolis Bridge
Massachusetts
- Tobin Bridge (northbound decrease)
- Bourne Bridge
- Sagamore Bridge
Michigan
New Hampshire
New Jersey
- Commodore Barry Bridge
- Vincent R. Casciano (Newark Bay) Bridge
New York
- Verrazano Narrows Bridge (each spans)
- Brooklyn Bridge
- Manhattan Bridge
- Williamsburg Bridge
- Newburgh-Beacon Bridge (each spans)
- Rip Van Winkle Bridge
- Ogdensburg-Prescott Worldwide Bridge
- George Washington Bridge
- Outerbridge Crossing Bridge
- Seaway Worldwide Bridge
- Thousand Islands Bridge
Ohio
- CUY-00490-0010 (I-490) Bridge
- CUY-00002-1441 (Predominant Avenue) Bridge
- CUY-00006-1456 (Detroit Avenue) Bridge
- CUY-00010-1613 (Carnegie Avenue) Bridge
- LUC-01W02-00002 (Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial) Bridge
- LUC-00002-1862 (Anthony Wayne) Bridge
Oregon
- Astoria-Megler Bridge
- St. Johns Bridge
Pennsylvania
- Walt Whitman Bridge
- Benjamin Franklin Bridge
- Betsy Ross Bridge
- Delaware River Turnpike Bridge
Rhode Island
- Claiborne Pell Newport Bridge
Texas
- Buffalo Bayou Toll Bridge
- Sidney Sherman Bridge
- Rainbow Bridge
- Veterans Memorial Bridge
- Hartman Bridge (each spans)
- GulfGate Bridge
Washington State
Wisconsin
What occurred in Baltimore?
The Dali container ship struck the bridge within the early morning hours of March 26, 2024, inflicting the construction to break down into the Patapsco River.
Six building employees died within the bridge collapse.
The results of the collapse rippled throughout Baltimore as longshoremen misplaced enterprise, commuters misplaced their journey route and provide chain delays disrupted the financial system.
The 1.6-mile bridge opened in March 1977 as the ultimate hyperlink of the Baltimore Beltway (Interstate 695), crossing over the Patapsco River.